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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effectiveness of an Audit Committee (AC) operating in a large 
government statutory body in an emerging economy, namely the Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia (IRBM). This study is timely, as previous studies focussing on AC effectiveness 
in relation to the public sector are sparse. Data collection was through in-depth interviews 
with key individuals involved in the IRBM governance process, including AC members, 
senior management and external auditors. The study finds existence of a weak AC 
governance function that inadequately oversees financial reporting and internal control 
systems. We find the independence of AC members questionable, as a communication gap 
exists between AC members and the external auditor. In particular, the study highlights that 
top management should ensure that its AC fulfils its assigned role and that urgent attention 
is given to issues on composition, appointment and diligence of its AC members. We 
conclude that the IRBM should consider improving independence by appointing an external 
independent AC member(s) from either the big four or an influential industry expert to 
provide the necessary input and expertise to ensure that public confidence continues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the last few decades, the rise of new public sector reforms along with economic crises have applied 
pressure on governments worldwide to observe good governance in order to restore public trust and confidence 
(Brinkerhoff, 2008; De Vries and Namec, 2013). It was high profile cases such as Enron and Worlcom that 
pointed to the failure of corporate governance in general and of Audit Committees (ACs) in particular in 
undertaking their work effectively though an AC comprised of well-qualified individuals. Consequently, the 
accounting profession became subject to criticism as pressures mounted, increasing questioning of the quality 
of financial reporting and auditing. In promoting audit quality and to restore public confidence in the accounting 
profession, the importance of the AC’s role continues to be highly relevant and on topic (see DeZoort and 
Salterio, 2001; Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Davies, 2009; Holmes and Zaman, 2012; Fitzgerald and Giroux, 
2014). 
Although a growing body of literature relates to ACs in the private sector, only a few studies have 
examined the organizational context and process of AC operations in relation to public sector organisations 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pollitt, 2011). In this light, Subramaniam et al. (2013) emphasised that public 
sector governance practice could best be understood through systematic examination of managers’ 
understandings and perceptions of factors that facilitate or inhibit good governance. Similarly, attempting to 
understand the role and function of the AC through the perceptions of members and senior managers of an 
organization could provide valuable insight about the importance of what constitutes ACs’ real practice. 
Despite the importance of ACs in government organisations, research studies in this area are rare and tend 
to focus on public sector AC members lacking competencies in undertaking their role and function, with serious 
repercussions on the quality of financial statements assurance (see for example Magrane and Malthus, 2010; 
Purcell et al., 2014). When the issue on AC competencies is further examined, this brings our attention to an 
essential element  on AC effectiveness,  i.e.  the process involved  for  proper  functioning  of the AC.  The 
governance of ACs is not solely effected by the existence of formal structure and process but is also dependent 
on the informal interaction with other internal parties as well as internal and external auditors (Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007). For this reason, our main objective is to explore the governance role 
played by the AC in one of the largest Malaysian public administrations set up as a statutory body1, namely the 
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM). The IRBM, as an agent for the government, was given the 
autonomy to assess, enforce and collect direct tax. Therefore, the IRBM has the responsibility to ensure the 
quality and the effectiveness of the overall administration of direct tax. In considering the fiscal and public 
accountability burden that it carries, it would be worthwhile to subject the IRBM to rigorous examination to 
establish whether or not the AC practices of the IRBM are in line with the provision of Malaysian statutory acts. 
Therefore, this study has two specific aims; first, we attempt to ascertain the accountability and governance 
practices, specifically the role of the AC within the IRBM organisational framework. Our second aim is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the AC in discharging its duty. 
Several studies have indeed focussed on IRBM. However, these studies have mainly related to tax 
determination and assessment issues (Loo et al., 2010; Dandago and Hassan, 2013; Isa, 2014; Mohamad et al., 
2016) and the usefulness of tax audits (Isa and Pope, 2011; Nordin et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that explores the governance role of the AC in the IRBM, and therefore a study of this 
nature fills an important gap in the literature not only from a government statutory body standpoint but also 
from an emerging country perspective. In addition, this study directly responds to a call for qualitative case 
study research using semi-structured interviews to explore the governance role of ACs (Uddin and Choudhury, 
2008; Hegazy and Stafford, 2016) in contrast to the typical quantitative research (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; 
Goodwin, 2003; Davies, 2009; Cai et al., 2015). 
A further contribution is that our study touches upon corporate governance theory. Berle and Means 
(1932), in their seminal study, introduced the concept of separation of ownership and control through 
shareholding and the subsequent disputes. This later produced an important economic-based theoretical 
framework contributing to the concept of corporate governance, i.e. the agency theory. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) generally defined the agency relationship as a contractual relationship between the shareholder as the 
principal and the managers as agents who are given authority to perform services on behalf of the principal. 
 
1 Some examples of statutory bodies in Malaysia are Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia), Securities Commission of M alaysia 
and Electoral Commission of Malaysia. 
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Prior research has also claimed that the agency theory provides understanding into the concept of analysing the 
governance relationship and outcomes of the particular organization (Gillan, 2006; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; 
Merino et al., 2010). Analyzing through the lens of agency theory, this study raises concerns on the overall 
effectiveness of the AC at the IRBM in the context of its independence and oversight function. This brings about 
an important question on the ability of the AC to drive IRBM towards compliance to legislation and meeting 
societal norms and community expectations (see for example Thomas and Purcell, 2018). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the literature review and 
focusses on the effectiveness of ACs. The literature review also discusses issues relating to the accountability 
and credibility of public sector entities in general. This is followed by a section discussing the background to 
IRBM. Our next two sections describes the research methodology and a thematic discussion of our findings, 
respectively. The final section summarises the conclusion and outlines some possible implications of the study. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
The formation of an AC and a sound internal audit is a cornerstone in establishing good corporate governance 
to reduce organisational risk (Goh, 2009; Bédard  and Gendron, 2010; Purcell et  al., 2014; Alzeban and 
Gwilliam, 2014; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015; Hegazy and Stafford, 2016). The requirement for ACs to be more 
effective was given prominence after the financial collapses in the early 2000s. The US Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 specified the duties of ACs in scrutinizing the financial statements and related disclosures and reviewing 
reports of internal and external auditors regarding internal control issues. In providing quality assurance, ACs 
are obligated to review and monitor the work performed by internal audit functions (DeZoort et al., 2002; 
Davies, 2009; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015). To achieve this, an AC should demonstrate strong governance and 
be competent, independent and transparent in providing full disclosure to both shareholders and other 
stakeholders alike (Graham et al., 2005; Barth and Schipper, 2007; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; Billings and 
Capie, 2009; Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Redmayne et al., 2011). 
Prior studies have shown that ACs’ independence and competency provide effective monitoring and 
allowed for better evaluation of internal and external audit functions (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Goodwin, 
2003; Zain et al., 2006). The effective monitoring role of ACs can also increase with a close working relationship 
between ACs and external auditors (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Farber, 2005). Some studies have even reported 
a positive correlation between the internal audit function and AC effectiveness (Goodwin, 2003; Turley and 
Zaman, 2004; Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Davies, 2009; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015). Such evidence further 
indicates that the effective communication and direct reporting line between the AC and the internal auditor are 
important, as the AC’s decision depends on the information and results performed by the internal auditors 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004; Zain and Subramaniam, 2007). 
Several empirical studies have further highlighted AC effectiveness issues.  AC effectiveness can be 
identified through competency (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993, p. 27), diligent oversight efforts (DeZoort et al., 
2002), added value to the organization (NACD, 2000), fulfilling its responsibilities (Rittenberg and Nair, 1993) 
and frequent meetings to discuss the discovery on the issues of internal control and to reduce fraud risk (Farber, 
2005). Other researchers, such as Gendron and Bédard (2006), have conducted in-depth interviews with several 
key players in three large Canadian publicly listed entities to examine the processes relating to AC effectiveness. 
The researchers implied that the concept of AC effectiveness can be translated into several dimension of AC 
process and outcome. Their research highlighted that ACs have enough power to perform their governance task 
in reviewing the financial statement and overseeing the internal control system, although ACs have less ability 
to detect fraud. Other researchers such as Yu-Hsuan Wu et al. (2016) have examined the relationship between 
AC independence, auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) and the likelihood of auditor going-concern 
decisions in failed UK companies. Their study reported that only 34% of failed UK companies tended to receive 
auditor going-concern modifications on their financial statements. Their empir ical findings also claimed that 
the AC’s characteristics are mediated to the auditor-provided NAS on auditor reporting decisions. The results 
showed that independent and expert ACs are less likely to issue unmodified going-concern reports prior to 
company failure. 
Focussing on the public sector, several studies have highlighted that the credibility of the AC in providing 
reasonable assurance is still being questioned due to a lack of sufficient knowledge, experience and skills 
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relating to the overall operation and process of these public entities (Magrane and Malthus, 2010; Purcell et al., 
2014). For example, Magrane and Malthus (2010) conducted semi-structured interviews to examine the AC 
effectiveness in New Zealand’s public sector. Their study revealed concerns over the independence of AC 
members and their competency while undertaking their audit task due to member rotation practices. Meanwhile, 
in an Australian-based study, Purcell et al. (2014) highlighted that in the local government of Victoria, the AC 
was introduced to act as a mechanism to assist council members and executive management towards honest 
stewardship. This included maintaining reliable systems of internal control and enhancing internal auditors’ 
independence. Purcell et al. (2014) also suggested that, as a way forward in improving local government 
governance, the governance structure and AC effectiveness needs to be reinforced by providing oversight of 
compliance, governance, internal control and risk mitigation. 
In addition, Davies (2009) reported that the significant relationship between the AC and internal auditor 
would result in the effective communication and promotion of a sound corporate governance system in the local 
government in Wales, United Kingdom. In a similar study, Subramaniam et al. (2013) identified those factors 
that may affect the corporate governance of state government agencies in Australia. Their study highlighted that 
the culture of good working relationships and sharing understanding among governance players in different 
functional areas could result in effective corporate governance. In an Eastern European context, Raudla et al. 
(2015) conducted a Estonian-based study that focussed on public officials who had been involved in 
performance audits between 2005 and 2012 to address the impact of performance audits on public sector 
organizations. The researchers indicated no such trade-off between auditor accountability and audit 
performance, though, surprisingly, the results of the survey showed that less than 10% of the respondents uphold 
the value of accountability in evaluating audit performance. In addition, Raudla et al. (2015) asserted that an 
increase in AC effectiveness would result in a positive performance audit as perceived by auditees. Recently, 
Hegazy and Stafford (2016) highlighted findings on the important governance role of the AC in two UK public 
sector organisations, i.e. foundation trusts and local authorities. The researchers revealed that improvements on 
the AC governance mechanism (i.e. membership, competency) enhanced the accountability of both UK public 
entities in relation to their internal control system and financial reporting quality. 
Studies on the audit quality in the public sector in the emerging economies provide some suggestions on 
the extent of work in this area. For instance, Chowdhury et al. (2005) revealed that there exists a gap between 
the report issued by the Bangladesh Auditor General (AG) and the expectations of its users. The gaps exist 
because the Public Account Committee has a lack of training and not much knowledge on public sector 
governance. In the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Kiraka et al. (2002) 
suggested that the legislation of member countries under their investigation strengthen their overs ight of audit 
officials to ensure their accountability. Meanwhile, issues on the Malaysian public sector have gained the 
interest of several researchers. Said et al. (2016), for example, argued that the integrity of the Malaysian public 
sector is determined by practicing strategic planning, audit and fraud control. On the other hand, Ahmad et al. 
(2009) asserted that the involvement of the AC in the public sector could enhance the effectiveness of internal 
audit functions and maintain their audit independence from management pressure. Hence, the AC, which is 
independent from management, has sufficient knowledge and experience auditing the organization and therefore 
would  be able to  monitor the government  activities and  identify its potential risk. Therefore,  the above 
discussions highlight serious concerns on the need for effective governance mechanisms to be in place in 
government organisations and provide direction for the current study on AC effectiveness in the IRBM. 
 
Background to the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
 
To ensure that public sector expenditure, revenue and assets are equitably managed, the Auditor General’s 
Department was established to audit the public sector. In 1998, the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Department 
stipulated a mandatory requirement for Federal Statutory Bodies (FSBs) to establish ACs in their organizations 
and specified clearly that the role of the AC is crucial in overseeing the management of the FSBs in their day- 
to-day operations. Meanwhile, the Malaysian Statutory Bodies (Accounts and Annual Reports) Act 1980 
emphasised that the FSB shall within six months of the financial year-end submit the Financial Statements to 
the Auditor General for audit. Furthermore, Articles 106 and 107 of the Federal Constitution and the Audit Act 
1957 require the Auditor General to audit the financial statements, financial management and the activities and 
management of both the government agencies and government-linked companies. Reports on those findings are 
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to be submitted to His Majesty for Royal assent and for it to be tabled in Parliament for debate (National Audit 
Department, 2015). 
The IRBM, as one of the government agencies established under the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
Act 1995 has been given the autonomy to manage all the collection of government tax administration including 
income tax, petroleum income tax, real property gain tax and other taxes so that the agency may achieve the 
targeted total revenue collection. As at end of 2017, the IRBM has successfully increased the tax collection by 
8.15% amounting to RM123.23 billion (Kanyakumari, March, 2018). As with other FSBs, the IRBM has 
included in its governance structure the pivotal role of the AC as being responsible for providing oversight 
functions that enhance audit quality and that build public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting. The 
establishment and governance role of the AC is subject to the Term of Reference set out by the IRBM2. 
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Our study is exploratory in nature and employs a case study approach. A case study method has been commonly 
used as the research method in the social sciences to allow researchers to explore the characteristics of real life 
events, such as small group behaviour (such as ACs), and organizational and managerial processes (Yin, 2009). 
The AC Term of Reference mentioned above and the governance role of ACs discussed in the literature have 
been used to guide us in our evaluation on the effectiveness of the AC of the IRBM. We opted to utilise the in- 
depth interview method to provide us with ideas emanating from the interviewees and to explore all factors that 
underpin the answers from the participants such as reason, opinion and belief (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003; Turner, 
2010). A researcher was tasked to interview seven key players in the governance structure of the IRBM who 
are directly involved with the organisation’s AC. These interview participants are: AC Chairperson; AC 
members; Chief Executive Officer (CEO); Director of Finance Department; Director of Internal Audit 
Department (IAD); Director of Risk Management Division; and, finally a senior member of the external audit 
team. Our interviews took place in the IRBM’s headquarters, where most of the interviewees are based, lasted 
approximately 1 to 2 hours in length and were guided by a set of pre-determined questions and additional 
probing. Table 1 presents the detailed background of our interview participants. It can be seen that all of our 
interviewees were experienced individuals and were able to provide valuable infor mation. 
 
                                       Table 1 Background Information of Interviewees                  
No.                      Current Position in IRBM                          Number of years in Academic Other Position 
                                                                                    current IRBM position         Qualification         
1                                AC Chairperson 
(non-independent executive director) 
2                                   AC Member 
(independent executive director) 
3 years                         Masters             Accountant General 
Department 
8 years                         Masters              Former Accountant 
General Department 
3                          Chief Executive Officer                                    34 years                           PhD 
4                   Director of Finance Department                              12 years                       Bachelors 
5              Director of Internal Audit Department                         17 years                       Bachelors 
6             Director of Risk Management Division                        31 years                       Bachelors 
7                               External Auditor                                           3 years                         Masters 
 
To facilitate our analysis, we transcribed our interview data to analyze interview responses. The main ideas 
and statements were highlighted and additional comments recorded. Content analysis was used to aid in the 
classification of the textual interview data for any of the themes that emerged from discussions with 
interviewees. All phrases, sentences and statements contained in the interview data were reviewed in relation to 
the themes and then organized into the most relevant category. In analyzing our interview data to determine 
emerging themes for our findings, elements of agency theory on independence and oversight functions of ACs 
were used to guide our analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  The Term of Reference for ACs was set out by the IRBM’s Board Secretariat Legal Advisory Department and became effective on 2 3 
September, 2016. 
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the main findings obtained from our interviews based on the themes that emerged 
from our discussions with the key governance actors in the AC process of the IRBM. The findings are presented 
in the subsections below. 
 
 
 
The Role of the IRBM Audit Committee 
 
In relation to the important role played by the AC in the IRBM, our interviewee responses varied as each 
interviewee provided his/her own perspective on how the AC influences the IRBM’s operations. For example, 
the Director of IAD reported that the AC’s role is significant in garnering public confidence and is a mechanism 
for instituting checks and balances, since the IRBM is responsible for tax administration in the country. The 
Director of IAD remarked: 
 
“The AC ensures the public that good corporate governance is in place in the IRBM. The AC also 
oversees the establishment of effective risk management, internal control and good governance.” 
 
Meanwhile, the CEO of the IRBM highlighted the AC’s capacity in shaping corporate culture within the 
organisation. The CEO emphasised this well and remarked: 
 
“Our AC makes positive impacts on maintaining and enhancing a strong corporate culture. I know 
that our AC promotes a culture of integrity and high-efficiency at all levels of the organisation.” 
 
Other interview participants were of the view that the AC held mainly a monitoring and supervisory role. 
For example, an AC member and another two Directors of the IRBM interviewed (i.e. Director of Finance 
Department and Director of Risk Management Division) highlighted the responsibilities of the AC in ensuring 
that the IRBM’s financial statements comply with the standards and regulatory requirements3. Interestingly, a 
discussion on the role of the AC emphasised the fact that the AC is independent  in undertaking all the 
responsibilities mentioned. An AC member remarked: 
 
“The AC is a committee of the board and is independent from the management. By this, the committee 
needs to make accountability a real practice in the organization in all the work done to ensure that 
its accountability is fulfilled.” 
 
Curiously, it was revealed by a number of our interviewees that no meetings are held between the AC and 
the external auditor despite there being a stringent requirement for the AC to hold such a meeting at least once 
a year, as specified in the Term of Reference of the IRBM’s AC. However, this non-compliance was justified 
with a cautious remark that such meetings will be undertaken in the future. The AC Chairperson pointed out: 
 
“We didn’t meet with the external auditor because there is no problem with the IRBM accounts. We 
reviewed the accounts before it was submitted to the Treasury for audit. In this case, we found that 
all the presentation and information in the accounts is acceptable.” 
 
Studies have indicated that informal interaction between the AC with top management and an external 
auditor enhance the reporting quality of financial statements and ensure adequacy of internal control within the 
organization (Turley and Zaman, 2007; Davies, 2009; Salleh and Stewart, 2012; Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Director of IAD provided assurance that future engagement with the external auditor will be 
held later in the year. The officer remarked: 
 
“The chairman of our AC has agreed to organize a meeting with the external auditor. We really do 
need their input.” 
 
 
3 On March 2013, the Malaysian Public Sector Accounting Standards (MPSASs) were developed and governed by the Accountant General’s 
Department (AGD) to enhance public sector accountability and transparency by implementing high-quality accounting standards in the 
preparation of financial statements. Generally, the development of MPSASs is drawn from International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
(IPSASs), which are published by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Later, in November 2015, MPSASs 33 was 
introduced, which requires all public sector entities, including the IRBM, to practice accrual basis in reporting their financial statements. 
This is, however, yet to be implemented. 
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It is apparent from the above remarks that the AC is aware of the importance of engaging with the 
external auditor. However, since it is stated in the Term of Reference for the ACs, it is advisable that the 
AC meet external auditors at least annually to discuss any issue that may offer benefit to both. 
 
Audit Committee Effectiveness 
 
When focussing on the composition of the IRBM’s AC, it appears that the committee comprises three members 
with non-executive capacity, two being independent members and one being a non-independent director. It was 
also revealed that one of the AC members had served the committee from 2005 in two different capacities. From 
2005 until November 2010, the AC member was an Accountant General (AG) and sat on the board of the IRBM 
and chaired the AC. After his retirement (at the end of 2010), he sat on the board of the IRBM as an independent 
consultant from December 2010 and currently remains in this position at the time of this research and when the 
interview was conducted. At the same time, he also serves as a member of the AC, and now his former deputy 
is an AG and chairs the AC. This, according to him, will not affect his performance and independence in the 
committee. He remarked: 
 
“Although I was the chairperson before and now my former deputy in the Accountant General’s 
office has taken the role of the chairperson, this does not affect my professionalism. As an accountant 
I am professional.” 
 
Discussions with interview participants also revolve around the issue of how the AC members can actively 
engage in undertaking its governance role with the concern that inactive or non-performing ACs will be a burden 
to the IRBM, as the time and resources of the organization will be wasted. On the account that the AC has 
undertaken its role in an effective manner, the AC Chairperson remarked: 
 
“We have managed to do routine and special audits. So, we can identify any weaknesses in the bud. 
By going in and identifying certain weaknesses, we can also inform other IRBM’s branches to make 
sure they can check whether the mistake takes place or not.” 
 
The remarks by the AC Chairperson above were supported by the Director of Risk Management Division, 
who agreed that the AC has added value to the organization. The Director remarked: 
 
“I find that the AC was very proactive and made a lot of suggestions and improvements. The risk 
management division was established due to the suggestion by one of the committee members.” 
 
Meanwhile, in highlighting the point regarding the effectiveness of the AC, the CEO seems to agree with 
the view of the AC Chairperson and Director of Risk Management Department. The CEO remarked: 
 
“AC complements and supports the oversight function of the Board by reinforcing the independence 
and objectivity of the Internal Audit Department. This adds value to the IRBM’s operation in order 
to achieve its objective.” 
 
On the same subject of AC effectiveness, two interviewees gave cautious statements. One of them is the 
Director of Finance Department, who voiced his concern about the subject. He remarked: 
 
“The effectiveness of the AC depends on the Internal Audit Department, as most of the time the AC 
would rely on the audit report. So, the Internal Audit Department must have sufficient manpower 
and be equipped with the right knowledge and skills to do the job.” 
 
In fact, the significance of the internal auditor’s role has also been addressed in prior studies as contributing 
to financial statement audits and enhancing the effectiveness of the AC (see for example Goodwin, 2003; Turley 
and Zaman, 2004; Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Davies, 2009; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015). Essentially, the 
internal audit department carries the same requirement as the AC in that they should have at least financial 
knowledge and experience relating to accounting, audit and finance (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2014). In the same 
subject, an AC member indicated that it is important for the AC to make self-evaluations on whether their role 
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and function are seen by the relevant parties as significant and bringing improvement to how the IRBM operates. 
The AC member noted: 
 
“We need to look at the impact. If there was a mistake before and the situation has been improved, 
it can be said the AC’s role was effective. Otherwise, the stakeholders will perceive us as a burden 
to the organization or a waste of time and resources.” 
 
On the other hand, the Director of Risk Management Department expressed his concern on the 
effectiveness of the AC in relation to the current state of IAD and AC operations. The Director noted that the 
audit functions of IAD, a department under direct supervision of the AC, are more focused on operat ional issues 
but not on the strategic issues4. In relation to this, the Director of Finance Department gave a suggestion on how 
the AC and IAD can become more relevant by contributing more to the organization in the future. The Director 
remarked: 
 
“The AC needs to check on effectiveness, efficiency and economics of the projects, activities and 
programs taken by the IRBM. The AC also needs to do a cost and benefit analysis.” 
 
In addition, the AC was perceived by the interview participants amongst the senior management of the 
IRBM as being responsible to pressure all organizational machineries within the organization to strive for 
achieving strategic goals set up by the IRBM. Such anticipation was given from the understanding that the AC 
is a committee of the BOD, and hence relevant parties associated with the AC should be directed towards the 
same strategic issues envisioned by the BOD. Interestingly, the expectation for the AC to contribute on strategic 
matters was not shared by the AC Chairperson, which contradicts the AC Chairperson’s earlier assertion that 
the AC was being proactive in many cases. The AC Chairperson noted: 
 
“We should perform risk-based auditing and review the accounting standard used in the preparation 
of the IRBM accounts.” 
 
The need to review the accounting standards used in preparing the financial statements of the IRBM raised 
above provide some signals where the AC could enhance its functions. Indeed, the anticipation of the IRBM’s 
senior management earlier and the lack of attention on essential issues as recognised by the AC Chairperson 
above give some indication on the quality of tasks undertaken by the AC. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study has examined the role and effectiveness of an AC in the context of a Malaysian large statutory body, 
i.e. the IRBM. The findings highlighted in this study shed important light on how the IRBM can enhance both 
efficiency and transparency  in managing  public  money and  its  financial reporting  through the effective 
functioning of its AC as a crucial organ of the board. 
This study also reports on the multiple roles played by the IRBM’s experienced AC members who support 
and assist the BOD in monitoring and reviewing risk, control and the governance process in the organization. 
Internally, that role must be undertaken by the AC to perform checks and balances in the areas of risk 
management, internal control and governance supported by a strong internal audit function. Although the AC 
has strong influence on the IRBM’s corporate culture, our attention was drawn to the lack of involvement of the 
AC in crucial areas, including supervision on compliance audits, taxation and on influencing the achievement 
of strategic goals within the power relations of the AC and the internal control system of the IRBM. Meanwhile, 
the aspiration to ensure AC functions that would best serve the interests of the public under the banner of public 
accountability appears to be compromised. In one aspect, the independence of the AC comes into question, as 
the practice on the appointment of certain AC members does not appear to promote a cause for an effective 
governance role of the AC. We believe that there is an urgent need for the policy on the appointment of AC 
members to be re-examined, with changes introduced to appoint an independent outsider either from either one 
 
 
4 The operational issues of the IRBM include managing personnel issues and budgeting, while the strategic issues touch upon the core 
business of the IRBM such as tax collection, tax audit and tax investigation. 
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of the big four accountancy firms or an influential industry expert to the IRBM in undertaking its crucial task. 
On the other hand, the absence of meetings between the AC and the external auditor reflects the missing 
engagement of the two parties in improving the operations of the IRBM to the fullest expectation of the public. 
Nevertheless, as with other research, this study also suffers from several limitations. First, our findings are 
based on the views of a limited number of key individuals around the important role of the AC of the IRBM. 
Therefore, future research should examine the informal governance process of the relevant parties within the 
power dynamic of the IRBM’s AC. It would also be interesting to investigate the possible tension that may arise 
in meeting the expected role of the AC for an organization responsible for collecting government revenue. To 
provide further insights into the issues examined in this paper, future research could examine the influence (if 
any) on changes in the regulatory setting, applicable accounting standards and the effectiveness of audit work 
undertaken by external auditors. Finally, the findings of our study also relate to a single statutory body; therefore, 
the findings cannot  be generalised  to  all statutory bodies,  including other public sector organisations in 
Malaysia. 
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